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Abstract—In mission-critical networks, command, alerts, and
critical data are frequently broadcast over wireless networks.
Broadcast traffic must be protected from malicious attacks,
wherein sources are impersonated or broadcast packets are
forged. Even though broadcast authentication eliminates such
attacks, attackers can still launch Denial-of-Service attacks
by injecting substantive false packets, which consume both
communication and computation resources. Due to inevitable
proliferation of duplicates of broadcast packets, it is especially
important to limit false packet propagation range. Evidently,
authenticating each packet before forwarding can effectively
contain false packets within one hop. But it results in considerable
end-to-end delay penalty on authentic packets. In this paper, we
propose a randomized authentication scheme, DREAM, which
contains most of false packets in one-hop range of attackers
and yet keeps end-to-end delay relatively low. Dream also
continuously monitors the contextual threat and dynamically
adjusts the trade-off among containment and end-to-end delay
performance. Extensive evaluations in ns2 validate our idea.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc wireless networks (MANET) are deployed
for many mission-critical applications, such as military op-
erations, emergency response and disaster recovery. Often
operating in multi-hop and open wireless environment, they
are vulnerable to various attacks, such as packet modification,
impersonation, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Thus, the
primary concern is to consistently assure availability of com-
munication resources, carefully grant authorized access and
prevent malicious tamper on network function from outside
the administrative domain.
Commands, alerts and data are frequently broadcast
network-wide to relay time-sensitive information and support
critical decision-making process. If broadcast traffic is not
authenticated, sources can be impersonated and message con-
tent can be forged by adversaries and rivals. Misleading or
false information could cause unnecessary operation or wrong
decision. Thus, it is important and common to authenticate
broadcast traffic.
However, without careful design, broadcast authentication
may suffer from DoS attacks and negatively affect perfor-
mance of broadcast protocol. In DoS attacks, attackers need
neither to compromise legitimate devices nor to know trust and
key information. They only flood faked and format-compatible
packets so as to consume excessive bandwidth, computation
and memory resources network-wide. Even though counterfeit
packets are rejected after signature validation, they cause
serious problems: (1) validating those packets wastes energy
and CPU resources; (2) before they are verified, storing those
packets temporally wastes buffer space; (3) transmitting those
packets wastes limited wireless bandwidth. Therefore, broad-
cast authentication protocols must contain forged messages
near attackers to prevent the rest of the network from infection.
A typical place to perform broadcast authentication is at the
ends of communication, which means that forwarders do not
check the integrity of packets. This broadcast authentication
scheme residing at application layer can be considered as
a scheme using “forward-first” policy: a node rebroadcasts
each packet if needed and then delivers authentic ones to
application after signature validation. Pure “forward-first”
scheme misses the containment capability. A false packet is
broadcast everywhere before its authenticity is verified. In
order to contain false packets, an intuitive way is to apply hop-
by-hop authentication scheme based on “authenticate-first”
policy at routing layer: a node only rebroadcasts authentic
messages after validation. In this way, false packets are filtered
out at the first hop and devices outside the transmission
range of attackers are immune. However, this hop-by-hop
authentication scheme imposes remarkable penalty on end-
to-end delay of legitimate traffic due to authentication delay
at each intermediate hop. The accumulated delay postpones
packet delivery to nodes far away from the sources and the
maximal delay is proportional to network diameter in hops.
Public key scheme and one-way hash function scheme
represented by TESLA [1] are two common cryptographic
primitives for broadcast authentication (Other alternatives are
extensively surveyed in [2]). TESLA is an efficient protocol
that utilizes one-way hash chains and delayed key disclosure
to authenticate broadcast traffic. But, TESLA incurs security
vulnerability if used together with “authenticate-first” policy.
This is because at the time forwarding nodes are able to
authenticate a packet Msg, the secret hash key hKey used
to sign Msg is already released by the source. Afterwards, no
nodes can trust any newly received packets signed by hKey.
Hence, the intermediate hop has to resign Msg under his
identity before forwarding. By manipulating resigning process,
a compromised node could flood as many packets as it wants
and viciously claim that those packets are sent by other
innocent sources.
In this paper, we present a novel broadcast authentica-
tion scheme, called DREAM, an acronym for DoS-Resistant
Efficient Authentication Mechanism. It effectively limits false
data injection via frequently using “authenticate-first” policy
based on public-key authentication. It also reduces the end-
to-end delay by allowing a small percentage of unverified
packets forwarded probabilistically via “forward-first” policy
so that remote nodes obtain the broadcast messages quickly.
Compared with most pertinent work considering containment
of false broadcast injection [3][4][5], DREAM offers the fol-
lowing two advantages: (1) The remote nodes, who receive the
unverified packets, are randomly determined for each packet.
Hence, DREAM avoids a single point of failure and achieves
load balancing. (2) In order to reduce end-to-end delay, not
everyone in the neighborhood of a broadcast source has to
forward unverified packets. Allowing only a small number of
packets to reach remote regions is sufficient to reduce delay,
while it effectively restricts contagious areas of false packets.
II. DESIGN GOAL AND SYSTEM MODEL
To guarantee that application receives only authentic pack-
ets, there is no doubt that every node needs to authenticate
each packet. Resources of nodes in one-hop neighborhood
of attackers cannot be protected unless they become inactive.
Nevertheless, we want to eliminate faked packets as early as
possible to protect resources far away from attackers and still
keep average end-to-end delay low for authentic packets. Next,
we present our network, broadcast traffic and attacker models.
A. Node and Network Model
We consider an ad hoc multi-hop wireless network support-
ing communication among a large number of devices. They
may be mobile, but without rapid changes of network topology.
These devices are all dispatched from a single administra-
tive domain. Before deployment, each device receives digital
certificates and necessary keying materials from a trusted
server. These devices are thus able to establish pairwise trust
relationship and shared secrets in field without contacting the
remote trusted server.
B. Broadcast Model
All of the nodes participate in a predetermined broadcast
protocol. The protocol can be in any form, ranging from
flooding, probabilistic broadcast [6] to tree-base broadcast
[7]. Although DREAM is designed based on flooding, it
works with other broadcast protocols by minor modification.
Any device can originate broadcast messages. A broadcast
message is uniquely defined by the ID of the originator and a
sequence number. Upon message arrival, the recipients decide
about duplication suppression, rebroadcast, and delivery to
applications according to the broadcast protocol used. All
broadcast messages are sent in clear text. Broadcast packets
are authenticated before delivered to applications.
C. Attacker Model
Attackers are unaffiliated with the administrative domain,
and they have neither valid certificates nor keys. Via snooping
on wireless channels, attackers can gather the details of broad-
cast and authentication protocol. They intend to launch DoS
attacks by flooding false or old packets. Since attackers do not
have keys or certificates, they cannot produce valid signatures
in false packets and those packets are dropped ultimately. Their
common strategy is to let false packets permeate throughout
the network as much as possible to aggressively consume
communication and computation resources network-wide.
III. DREAM
In order to promptly contain injected false packets, we need
to push public-key authentication from application layer down
to network layer so that the broadcast protocol only allows
authentic packets to be rebroadcast after validation. A hop-
by-hop authentication scheme relying on “authenticate-first”
policy perfectly contains false packets in one hop range of
an attacker. However, it unfavorably imposes significant delay
penalty on authentic traffic, especially for the traffic to the set
of nodes far away from broadcast sources.
DREAM addresses this end-to-end delay issue by relaxing
containment requirement. The main idea is to allow a small
and controlled number of packets transmitted to remote loca-
tions quickly without authentication in a probabilistic manner.
A path segment over which packet P is not validated before
forwarding is referred to as an unverified forwarding path
for P . Nodes along the unverified forwarding paths forward
packets before authenticating; while the other nodes, represent-
ing the majority of the network, authenticate packets before
forwarding. Those unverified transmissions virtually reduce
the network radius from the broadcast source and decrease
end-to-end delay. 1
Because of the diversified suppression policies of broad-
cast protocols, DREAM is integrated with broadcast protocol
and independently runs at each device. The architecture of
DREAM contains three modules as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. DREAM Architecture
Packet Authentication Module is responsible for signing and
validating packets. There are two operating modes yielding
different delay and containment trade-offs.
Risk Management Module continuously monitors contextual
threat. When evidence of false packet injection shows up, the
module adjusts the operating mode in Packet Authentication
Module to a more defensive and secure mode.
Neighbor Management Module periodically exchanges hello
messages with one-hop neighbors. Hello messages not only
indicate a node’s liveness but also include a field specifying
a node’s one-hop neighborhood size. In order to prevent
malicious tampering, hello messages are signed and verified.
Next two sections are devoted to Packet Authentication and
Risk Management modules separately.
1This may introduce out-of-order packets with large delay variance. We
assume that applications will reorder packets if in-order delivery is required.
A. Packet Authentication
Packet Authentication Module comprises two parts: (a)
signing at sources and (b) verification and forwarding at
receivers. Whenever a source sends out a broadcast packet,
it signs the packet. Upon receiving a broadcast message,
a node probabilistically determines to forward it first or to
authenticate it first. When a node authenticates the packet
first, we call the node an authenticating node. No matter
which choice is made, each node will (a) only forward a
unique broadcast packet at most once (it does not forward
identified false packets); and (b) validate the packet and send
the authentic one to applications. The message format is:
IDsrc, Seqno,Msg, PubKeySignsrc,HT, IDfwder
, wherein
PubKeySignsrc = SignsrcPubKey(IDsrc, Seqno,Msg)
IDsrc and IDfwder are IDs of the source and the
last forwarder, respectively. When the source signs Msg,
IDfwder is set to IDsrc since source is the last forwarder.
PubKeySignsrc is the public key signature signed by the
source and is never changed during forwarding process. HT
is the number of hops traversed since the last authenticating
node. It is reset to 0 at every authenticating node. Sources
always set HT to 0. Each forwarder, who forwards the
unverified copies, increases HT by 1. Here, we assume
that receivers know the public key of the source; otherwise,
sources’ certificates should be broadcast as well.
Next, we will describe packet verification and forwarding
algorithm at receiver sides based on flooding.
We reduce average end-to-end delay at the cost of imper-
fect containment. Therefore, it is crucial to carefully control
unverified forwarding. We have the following requirements:
• The decision is independently made to avoid message
negotiation;
• The decision is probabilistically made to achieve load
balancing and to prevent a single point of failure;
• The number of hops that an unverified message is allowed
to travel is controlled so that on one hand, broadcast
packets spread out in space fast and on the other hand,
false injected packets are contained near their originators;
• The number of “forward-first” nodes is kept small to
reduce the cost of communication and public key com-
putation wasted on false packets.
Public key signature verification is an expensive operation
and usually takes time in seconds or tens of milliseconds in
resource-constrained wireless mobile devices. Hence, a verifi-
cation queue is placed in DREAM to buffer the packets wait-
ing for signature verification. We assume for simplicity that
at any moment, only one signature verification is performed
so that spare CPU resources are reserved for other tasks.
A verification demon process, whenever free, continuously
monitors the verification queue. Once a packet is found at
the head of the queue, the verification process removes the
packet from queue, verifies its public key signature and relays
the authentic one to applications. In addition, if the authentic
packet has not been forwarded yet, it rebroadcasts the packet
not under suppression. When the demon process completes
processing a packet, it becomes free.
Upon receiving a broadcast message m, a node v probabilis-
tically determines whether to forward m first or authenticate
m first according to Algorithm 1. Rand is a random number
generated uniformly from [0, 1]. b, c and K are system
parameters. b and c are the expected numbers of neighbors in
the one-hop neighborhood of the source and the last forwarder
m.IDfwder (other than the source) respectively, who forwards
m first. K is the maximum number of hops that m is allowed
to travel without verification.
Algorithm 1: Verification and Forwarding Algorithm
input : An overheard broadcast message m
if (overheard messages with the same1
(m.IDsrc,m.seqno) before) then return;
if (m.HT == 0 & m.IDfwder is unknown neighbor)2
then return;
if (I am one-hop neighbor of m.IDsrc) then3
prob = b/ | Nbr(m.IDfwder) |;4
else5
prob = 2 ∗ c/ | Nbr(m.IDfwder) |;6
end7
if (Rand > prob or m.HT == K) then8
// authenticate m first;9
m.HT = 0;10
place m into verification queue;11
else12
// forward m first;13
m.HT ++;14
rebroadcast m;15
place m into verification queue16
end17
Algorithm 1 incorporates 2 steps:
(i) Suppression and Filtering (Line 1-2): If v has received
at least one message with the same sequence number from
the source before, message m is dropped. Thereby, a node
forwards each broadcast message at most once. If v is one-
hop away from the last authenticator, which is an unknown
neighbor, message m is ignored due to lack of trust.
(ii) Probabilistic Pruning (Line 3-17): v decides whether
to forward m first or authenticate m first probabilistically.
|Nbr(m.IDfwder)| is the neighborhood size of last forwarder
m.IDfwder. This value is available via Neighbor Management
module. b is usually set to an appropriate value so that
unverified broadcast messages can cover most directions (4
for instance). c is selected from [1, 2] to make the event that
all the one-hop neighbors are pruned unlikely. Both b and c
cannot be too large, because we need to control the number of
unverified packets. The constant 2 before c in line 6 accounts
for the fact that on average, half of the neighbors of the last
forwarder have already heard m. Considering a case that m is
forwarded from node A to v, via B, averagely half neighbors
of B have already heard m broadcast by A, thus suppressing
m according to line 1.
If m has already traversed K hops without verification, it
is better to authenticate m first to confine its permeation in
case of a false packet. If v decides to authenticate m first,
it resets HT field and places m in the verification queue.
If v decides to forward m first, it increases HT field by
1, forwards m and then places m in the verification queue.
The verification process is responsible for rebroadcast after
signature verification. If m.HT > 0, verification process
knows that m has already been forwarded once.
Since we use |Nbr(m.IDfwder)| to make probabilistic
forwarding decision (in Line 4 and 6), network topology
should be relative stable so that during the Hello period, the
neighbor information is accurate. Otherwise, inaccurate and
outdated neighborhood sizes may result in more or less number
of nodes forwarding the packet first from the last forwarder.
B. Risk Management
Nodes working as in previous section are said to be in
Normal Mode. Via signature verification, they are able to
detect emergence of false packet attacks if the number of
received packets with invalid signature in a time interval
exceeds a predetermined threshold. They switch to hop-by-hop
authentication scheme and totally disable the “forward first”
policy to contain false packet injection in a defensive way.
They are then said to be in Alert Mode. Conversely, when
the false packet attack lessens, nodes switch back to Normal
Mode to trade for improved end-to-end delay. The transition
between two modes is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Adaptation to Contextual Threat
Each node continuously monitors the number of detected
false packets every riskWindow interval. The node switches
to Alert Mode if this number reaches α and switches back to
Normal Mode if this number drops to β. α and riskWindow
are related to the tolerable percentage of CPU resource spent
in evaluating false packets before switching to Alert Mode.
Suppose the processing time to validate one public key
signature is Tval seconds, a node can tolerate Tval∗αriskWindow
CPU resource wasted on validating false packets. For mission
critical networks, this percentage can be set to a small value.
β is there to avoid frequent transitions and instability.
Switching to Alert Mode adversely increases end-to-end de-
lay. However, we isolate the rest of network from infection and
their computation and communication resources are protected.
It is expected that when converging, only the nodes around the
attackers enter Alert Mode. Other nodes can still receive the
packets through alternative forwarding paths quickly.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of DREAM
in ns2 network simulator by comparing it with hop-by-hop
authentication scheme and Dynamic Window (DW) scheme
proposed in [3]. In Dynamic Window scheme, the forwarding
decision is made by comparing the size of a locally maintained
dynamic window on sensor nodes and the number of hops
the incoming message traversing after its last authentication:
if window size is larger, they use forwarding-first; otherwise,
they use authentication-first. Additive Increase Multiplicative
Decrease (AIMD) technique is used to dynamically manage
the window: if an authentic message is received, window size
increases; otherwise, window size decreases.
The criteria of our evaluation represents two aspects: penalty
on authentic messages and containment capability of false
messages. We have the following metric for legitimate packets:
• The average end-to-end delay: End-to-end (authentica-
tion) delay of packet m from broadcast source src at
node v is defined as the interval between the moment src
broadcasts m into wireless networks and the moment v
finishes verification of m.
We have the following metrics for false packets:
• The number of nodes forwarding the false packets.
• The number of nodes receiving the false packets.
• The number of public key signature validation.
Public-key signature validating time is set to 0.5 second. At
any moment, a device performs a single public key validation
and all the other validation requests, up to 50, are queued. Pub-
lic key signature has size 40 bytes. Each node is equipped with
an omni-directional antenna operating on a single channel.
The channel model is two-ray path-loss propagation model.
The broadcast traffic is sent via CBR (constant bit rate) traffic
with packet size 64 bytes in UDP. 802.11 DCF Medium
Access Control protocol is used with default configuration.
Transmission range is 250m.
We investigate two network topologies, i.e. grid topology
and random topology.
A. Grid Topology
The first scenario we study is grid topology and each data
point is averaged over 3 runs of simulations. Since delay
penalty is critical in large scale networks with long diameter,
we place 400 nodes in a grid. Each row (column) contains 20
nodes equally spaced with distance 240 meters apart. There
is a single broadcast source located at the left top corner. It
continuously sends CBR traffic at the rate of a packet every
2 seconds. The average network radius from the broadcast
source is 10 hops based on the setting.
First, we study end-to-end authentication delay for legiti-
mate traffic in absence of attackers. We vary K from 3 to
5 and c from 1.0 to 2.0. b is set equal to c. The length of
riskWindow is 6 seconds. α = 6 and β = 1. For Dynamic
Window Scheme, the initial window size is set to 64. Additive
increase and multiplicative values are 1 and 2 separately,
default as in [3].
As shown in Figure 6, the average end-to-end delay in hop-
by-hop authentication is the worst, above 4.6 seconds because
the average length of paths from the broadcast source is 10
hops and the public key validation delay is 0.5 second. Clearly,
the average end-to-end delay in Dynamic Window scheme is
optimal at about half a second. Because there are no false
packets detected, the window size is at least 64, which is
always greater than the number of hops traversed since last
authenticator. The performance of DREAM is shown by the
middle 4 lines. As c increases, the end-to-end delay decreases
since more nodes are inclined to forward packets first, thus
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virtually reducing the end-to-end path length. However, as
c increases above 1.5, the degree of improvement levels
off. When K increases, end-to-end delay decreases because
distance between two successive authenticators is lengthened
and the entire network is quickly covered.
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Next, we study the containment capability of DREAM
and its response to malicious injection from Figure 3 to 5.
Clearly, if attackers always flood less than α false packets in
riskWindow interval, DREAM never switches to Alert Mode.
However, this is not the best interest for attackers. Therefore,
we focus on cases of high-rate false injection. Again, we use
the same configuration as before except that an attacker is
flooding simultaneously near the source at the left top corner
of grid. The attacker floods packets at the rate of 1 packet
per second. During the false injection attack, it is out of
question that all the neighboring nodes have to receive the
false packets and validate them. But our scheme can effectively
confine the false packets within a small number of nodes. The
number of false packets is normalized by the total number
of false packets sent by the attacker. The normalized number
of received false pakets is below 45 for both DREAM and
Dynamic Window scheme since they both switch to defensive
mode. However, before the window size in DW is adjusted
down, many false packets are broadcast to the whole network.
Furthermore, the mixing traffics of good and false packets
interdict the slowdown of dynamic window. For every packet
sent by attacker, DW has 12 nodes to forward, 43 nodes to
receive and 19 nodes to verify the message. On the contrary,
the containment performance of DREAM is close to hop-by-
hop authentication. The infection of false injection increases
as c or K increases. However, waste on both transmission and
computational resources by the false packets are under control.
The end-to-end authentication delay in presence of the
attacker is shown in Figure 7. Delay for both DREAM and
Dynamic Window scheme increases, compared with the case
in absence of attackers.
From the above measurements, we see clear tradeoff be-
tween end-to-end authentication delay and containment capa-
bility, i.e. public key signature computational overhead and
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forwarding overhead for false packets.
B. Random Topology
The second scenario we study is random topology with 400
nodes randomly placed in a 4000m*4000m network. We make
sure that the resulting topology is almost connected. There are
1 broadcast source randomly selected to send CBR traffic at
rate of 2 packets per 3 seconds and two attackers randomly
selected to send CBR traffic at rate of 1 packets per 2 seconds
each. Nodes switch to Alert Mode whenever the number of
false packets in 6-second interval reaches 3 and falls back
to Normal Mode when this number drops to 1. Since the
processing time for one public key signature validation is 0.5
second, a node can tolerate at most 3 ∗ 0.5/6 = 25% CPU
spend in evaluating false signatures.
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The end-to-end delay for two example configurations of
DREAM is compared with the delay for Dynamic Window
and hop-by-hop authentication schemes in Figure 8. X-axis
shows 3 random scenarios with different location deployments.
As usual, hop-by-hop authentication has the worst end-to-end
delay for authentic traffic. DREAM with c set to 1.3 halves the
end-to-end delay. Further improvement is present with c set
to 1.5. Even though Dynamic Window Scheme has the best
performance in terms of end-to-end delay, it is not resilient
to false packet injection mixed with the legitimate traffics.
As shown in Table I, for the total 330 false packets sent
by attackers, Dynamic Window scheme forwards more than
5000 false packets in order to achieve the desired delay. But
DREAM only forwards tens of false packets before nodes
around attackers switch to Alert Mode. Due to space limit,
we do not place the results for the number of false packets
received and validated here. Those two results are similar as
the number of false packets being forwarded.
TABLE I
NORMALIZED # OF FALSE PACKETS FORWARDED
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
DREAM c=1.3 28 12 12
DREAM c=1.5 30 25 32
Dynamic Window 6992 5768 14207
Hop-by-Hop 0 0 0
We show sensitivity to b in Figure 9, varying c and fixing
K at 5 in absence of attackers. The same configuration as in
Figure 8 is used. Increasing b decreases end-to-end delay, but
without dramatic improvement. Possible reasons are lack of
enough number of neighbors around broadcast sources or the
set of non-authenticating forwarders are not spread out enough
in all directions.
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V. RELATED WORK
Wang, Du and Ning proposed a dynamic window scheme to
contain bogus data by public key cryptography (PKC) authen-
tication [3], where sensor nodes determine whether to verify
a message first or forward the message first by estimating
their distance from the malicious attackers and how many
hops the incoming message has passed without authentication.
As we show in the evaluation section, despite the fact that
Dynamic Window scheme displays good potential to improve
end-to-end delay of authentic traffic, it is not robust against
“smart” attackers who maliciously manipulate AIMD scheme.
Additional, during the decreasing process of AIMD, a large
number of false packets are broadcast to the whole network.
Drissi and Gu considered a large sensor network with a few
predetermined trusted and better secured nodes which divides
the whole network into subnets [5][4] . Trusted nodes use
TESLA to broadcast messages to its subnet and each ordinary
node, upon receiving broadcast messages from its subnet,
rebroadcasts them before validation. Trusted nodes exchange
broadcast messages among themselves. A source other than
the trusted nodes sends messages to a nearby trusted node.
However, the predetermined set of “trusted” nodes may attract
attacks and too much authentication and coordination overhead
consumes their battery and the battery of nodes around them
quickly. Besides, how messages are sent from source to trusted
nodes, from trusted nodes to trusted nodes and from trusted
nodes to subnets may introduce additional vulnerability, such
as DoS attacks and jamming. [8] proposed an efficient, one-
time signature-based broadcast authentication scheme that
reduces storage usage and includes a re-keying mechanism and
[9] introduced a novel cryptographic paradigm of broadcast
authentication with “preferred” verifiers. But, none of them
offers containment capability against false injection attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel broadcast authentica-
tion scheme, which confines false packet injection mostly
inside one-hop neighborhood around attackers with improved
end-to-end delay for legitimate traffic. Via frequently using
“authenticate-first” policy, DREAM contains most of faked
packets in one-hop neighborhood of attackers. Probabilistic
“forward-first” decision dramatically improves the end-to-end
delay for nodes far away from the broadcast source. With
dynamic adaptation to changing threat level, our scheme is
flexible to trade off delay with containment capability. Ex-
tensive simulation verifies end-to-end delay and containment
performance in DREAM.
In the future, we plan to integrate DREAM with other
broadcast protocols and test its performance. DREAM relies
on the probabilistic decision to push unverified packets re-
motely. But the unverified forwarding path may not be optimal
for quick coverage. We will apply GPSR routing protocol
[10] to deterministically forward the unverified packets further
along the best direction. We will also investigate counter-
measurement for attacks on broadcast suppression, wherein
attackers pretend to be the broadcast source and send packets
with higher or equal sequence numbers before the true source.
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